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1Listening to the world: sounding out the surroundings of 
environmental law with Michel Serres
Danilo Mandic
Abstract
This chapter draws on the work of the French philosopher Michel Serres and his 
exposition of appropriation, the distinctions of subjects and objects, hard and soft 
pollution, and local and global perceptions, and discusses them as essential devices 
for the legal comprehension of the environment. This chapter has a triple intent. First, 
it aims to deploy Serres’s thinking on nature and its broken relation to humanity in 
order to recognise how law with its principles, functions and operations plays a 
significant role in constituting both this break, and this relation. Serres’s excogitation 
on law reveals that our relation with nature is intrinsically a legal one. Second, by 
identifying Serres’s understanding of the relationship between law and nature, this 
chapter offers a way into ‘sounding out’ environmental law, and importantly, to 
recognise law as antecedently ‘environmental’. At first glance contradictory but still 
within the aims of this handbook to provide novel methods to approaching and 
understanding environmental law, the final aim is to employ Serres’s ‘anti-method’ 
and understanding of knowledge. This important aspect of Serres’s idiosyncratic 
approach is gradually unfolded in this chapter.
We do not know what the world is like today; we are only beginning to know it and 
this knowledge differs from our knowledge of a circumscribed object.
Michel Serres1
The necessity to regulate the relationship between humans and their 
surroundings, as well as the impact they have on these surroundings, is what 
constitutes the core of environmental law. In view of the urgency of responding to 
environmental degradation, environmental law emerged as a modern creation that 
integrates various legal principles from other areas of law. 2 For these reasons, and in 
contrast to other legal categories, environmental law has been found to lack the 
‘philosophical underpinnings’3 that might provide an exclusive ‘disciplinary’ 
epistemological basis to sounding out its subject matter. 
Environment (en ‘in’ + viron ‘circle’) is often understood as the (‘natural’) 
surroundings that encircle human beings. It is ‘the combination of elements whose 
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2complex interrelationships make up the settings, the surroundings and the conditions 
of life of the individual and of society as they are or as they are felt’. 4 Two terms, 
consistently reappearing in definitions of environment, call our attention. The first is 
‘circumstance’ (circum ‘around’ + stare ‘stand’) as that which encircles, 
encompasses, and conditions one’s position against the very surrounding. The second 
is ‘condition’ (condicionem ‘agreement’, condicere ‘to speak together’), a ‘thing 
demanded or required as a prerequisite’ that allows an act to take place. 5 
Environment is thus both a circumstance and a condition that surrounds and 
determines (human) life. These terms imply and confirm the nature/ society 
distinction upon which environmental law is fundamentally established. The law 
follows rather too faithfully the above distinction, and as a consequence acts as if it 
were just an effect, indeed a reaction to emerging necessities. The law, however, is 
not just a corollary. It is both a circumstance and condition to its surroundings. It 
affects its surroundings in radical ways, rather than just following suit, reacting to the 
circumstances and conditions. In a self-contradictory way the law reverses the 
surroundings by circumscribing them: the natural world with its elusive but material 
force remains objectified in the gaze of the law and is often reduced to an 
understanding of a natural resource for human enterprises, ‘a scene of spectacles’. 
Delimited by a conceptual circumference (circum ‘around’ + ferre ‘bear, carry, suffer, 
endure’), the environment is restricted within a boundary – thus what seems to be a 
circumferential surrounding, is in fact the object (circumstance) of concern and 
subject of environmental law regulation. 
This chapter draws on the work of Michel Serres and his exposition of 
appropriation, the distinctions of subjects and objects, hard and soft pollution, and 
local and global perceptions, and discusses them as essential devices for the legal 
comprehension of the environment. First, it deploys Serres's excogitation on law 
which reveals that our relation with nature is intrinsically a legal one. Second, by 
identifying Serres’s understanding of the relationship between law and nature, it 
offers a way into ‘sounding out’ environmental law, and importantly, to recognise law 
as antecedently ‘environmental’. Third, it employs Serres’s ‘anti-method’ that 
provides epistemic passages through which we can rearticulate the subject-object 
relationship, move beyond the common understanding of the environment as 
surroundings, and edify law to ‘listen to the world’.
Introduction: Relations as conditions
Michel Serres’s work is hard to pin down. Bearing the title of a philosopher of 
science, his explorations constantly disperse among different disciplines and 
4
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3intersperse with seemingly disparate categories of knowledge.  No wonder he has 
been dubbed as ‘an itinerant theorist’.6 His oeuvre is constituted by a constant 
bridging of literature, mythology, religion, law, science, history, communication, and 
mathematics with a final instruction to obliterate the distinction between soft 
(humanities) and hard (sciences). In addition to his unique writing style, which 
challenges established academic conventions, his ‘method’ of inquiry is quite 
demanding and requires assiduity on the part of the reader.7 As rightly remarked, 
‘Serres is extracurricular: you have to read him in your own time (...) and if you 
study him, you won’t find an applicable method that you can use in turning out your 
own dissertation and books on schedule.’ 8 With this in mind, engaging with Serres is 
not straightforward. But contemplating with him is an edifying and intellectually 
gratifying experience. His understanding of relations, knowledge, and method are 
crucial to our discussion here.
In addition to his humanistic background, Serres is an educated 
mathematician. This largely informed his early work on thermodynamics and 
information theory, where energy and information, matter and codes, entropy and 
noise were brought together in order to study disorder as a condition in the formation 
of complex systems. In his later work, the elements and processes of communication 
become his main focus in his extensive project, consisting of five books Hermès 
(1961-1980)9 further pursued with his notion of parasite (noise) in his seminal work 
The Parasite.10 With its different meanings and disguises,11 the parasite is introduced 
as an operator that both establishes and breaks relations, enabling us to recognise the 
ineluctable presence of the ‘third’, which Serres traces in different topographies of 
relations traversing human, political, economic, religious, scientific, natural, and 
mythic domains. By avoiding static positions and their restricted viewpoints, Serres 
immerses himself in the middle of the fluid and turbulent aspects of relations.12 He 
comments: ‘So I don’t make my abstractions starting from some thing or some 
operation but through a relation, a rapport. A reading of my books may seem difficult, 
6
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4because it changes and moves all the time.’13 His main subject of enquiry and method 
of study complement each other as they are both engaged with relations that traverse 
space and time, in a constant discovery of prepositions, cords, links, and relations 
from the multiplicity where forms, systems or structures emerge and transform: 
‘Relations spawn objects, beings and acts, not vice versa.’14 
In the exploration of the relations and interrelations between sciences, 
domains, and topographical extensions, the conception of knowledge is absolutely 
essential in his work. For Serres, knowledge is an enclosing practice that is based on 
violence and discipline, an order of representation, a localised language of 
epistemology, a critique that excludes irregularity and instability and fails to embrace 
the global; an archipelago of localised islands of stability and rationality, an exception 
to the rule of disorder. Conversely, knowledge is to be found in the noisy passages 
that connect islands and this is what largely informs what he terms the ‘third 
instructed’ or the new knowledge that has an active role in inventing.15 In that sense, 
both ontology and epistemology take place in these relations and passages, and where 
knowledge becomes ‘an ecology in which things and ideas interact.’16 In the midst of 
the means that establish exchange, distribution, and circulation as well the processes 
that result from them, ‘knowledge is an environment’.17
Transcending the limitation of knowledge categories is what characterises his 
‘non-epistemological’ position. Serres refutes epistemology since, in his view, it 
‘implies that rationality exists only in sciences, nowhere else.’18 In other words, he is 
abandoning epistemology since it always entails a judgmental perspective, and 
implies some sort of critique that engages only with oppositions.19 One needs to be 
mindful of this standpoint that Latour succinctly comments about Serres’s ‘a-critical’ 
philosophy:
Instead of believing in divides, divisions, and classifications, Serres studies how 
any divide is drawn, including the one between past and present, between 
culture and science, between concepts and data, between subject and object, 
between religion and science, between order and disorder and also of course, 
divides and partitions between scholarly disciplines. Instead of choosing camps 
and reinforcing one side of the divide, of the crisis, of the critique – all these 
words are one and the same – Serres sits on the fence.20
13
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5This fence, however, is not static but constantly rearranged and displaced depending 
on the specificity of the medium or the means that enable such a relation. In such a 
way, his subject matter leads the method by embodying the relation in question, its 
fluctuation and disordering potentials, bringing science and non-science, law and non-
law in proximity: ‘All knowledge is bordered by that about which we have no 
information.’21 In his view, method imitates the techniques of mastery and closure, 
implying repetition and thus manifesting redundancy. For that reason he insists that 
we should return to method’s etymological root (meta ‘beyond’ + hodos ‘a way’) in 
making passages and seeking means to access, go through, invent.22 For Serres, 
method ‘seeks but does not find’,23 and as Harrari and Bell finely point out, his 
‘method invents: it is thus an anti-method.’24 By circumventing the edifices of order, 
rationality and objectivity Serres liberates us from the method. It is a method of a 
journey25 that invites us to join Ulysses in his wanderings and circumnavigation 
around the world.26 
When crossing these passages, relations and intersections Serres cannot but 
encounter law. He perceives law as both an abstract and material process through 
which subjectification and objectification takes place; a mechanism, agency, 
operation that binds individuals into a collectivity and enables social relations; an 
analytical tool that delimits and decides upon the right and wrong. The law has played 
an important role in his writings and substantially informed his work about 
nature/environment. Regrettably, such a significant resonance of Serres’s writings has 
rarely been recognised in the environmental legal scholarship. To amend this 
omission, this chapter addresses Serres’s thinking about law’s relation with 
environment. While his work has already contributed to the environmental discourse, 
27
 most notably by his discussion on the Natural Contract, this chapter will attempt to 
expand Serres’s thought for the purposes of identifying fresh approaches to 
environmental law. The epistemic passages presented below lead us to sound out the 
very borderline that constitutes the in and around nature and culture, human and in-
human, that is, the circumstance of environmental law. 
In the following discussion, Serres’s work is divided in three segments. It 
begins with a consideration of appropriation as pollution and it introduces property 
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6rights as 'natural' rights in which law partakes. The second part deals with his 
insistence on recognising a natural contract, or better, adding yet another virtual 
contract to the existing social contract in order to overcome the division between 
nature and culture. The third part extends to Serres’s latest recognition of Biogea (life 
and earth), and the possibilities of granting nature the legal status of ‘person’. 
Appropriation 
The modern notion of property rights, legally conceptualised as relations between 
subjects toward an object, are the key principles that inform our relationship with 
nature. While for seventeenth century natural lawyers the view of property (rights) as 
a means of organising social life and its surrounding emerged from the intrinsic 
relation between man and the natural world around him, the liberal thinkers of the 
eighteenth century saw property (rights) as an instrument that is constructed by law, 
emphasising individual and possessive ideas with regard to its environment.28 Despite 
the continuous changes of legal conceptions, the fact that property is concerned with 
demarcations, the use of resources, and distribution of rights and duties makes 
property conceptions fundamentally environmental.29 Serres invites us to reconsider 
this before any rationalisation or actualisation of law takes place and suggests that we 
should look instead into the 'natural' appropriation.
In the first pages of his Malfeasance, Serres asks 'How do the living inhabit a 
place? How do they establish it, recognize it? (…) How do animals crate links as 
powerful as the law is for humans, links that enable them to appropriate the habitat 
were they dwell and live?'30 The short answer is located in the 'natural' behaviour of 
all living species: through dirt, spit, excrement, sperm, blood. Bodily discharges 
appropriate places, thus 'appropriation takes place through dirt. More precisely, what 
is properly one’s own is dirt.’31 This stercoral theory of property proposes that when 
something is clean there is no established ownership, no distinctions, just a white 
space ready to be cultivated, inseminated, polluted, and thus circumscribed.  The 
common becomes one’s own by the act of soiling, which instantaneously demarcates 
the space and makes it a place that is proper. Similarly in order to sustain itself the 
parasite abuses the host, it soils the place in order to appropriate.32 One of the 
examples Serres gives is that when one spits in their soup it is clean to them but dirty 
to others. Here is the paradox: by the very act of making it dirty and polluting it, the 
28
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7principle of appropriation is established by clearing out the space.33 The act of 
dwelling as something that precedes the building is in actuality preceded by 
pollution.34 Pollution becomes a natural act. From soup to appropriation of lands and 
birth of nations, this is the natural right that precedes positive or conventional right: 
‘the forgotten foundations of property rights’.35
Pollution in legal terms, as Sagoff points out, is a 'form of coercion – an 
assault upon persons and trespass upon property',36 which asserts an understanding of 
pollution as an attack on the delimitations that law has imposed by its property 
constructions. While environmental law fundamentally builds its edifice from 
presiding over the access to and the use of property (rights), Serres suggests 
considering how property rights are primarily a result of an act of pollution. This is 
further confirmed by Serres's regular use of etymology to show that the verb ‘to have’ 
has the same origin as ‘to inhabit’, thus it turns the Cartesian subjectification into an 
objectification: 'I inhabit, therefore I have'.37 While the Cartesian distinction is often 
recalled in environmental discourse for the purposes of criticising the established 
separation between human and nature, Serres insistence on considering the distinction 
of spaces whereby property rights are established, provides us with a position to deem 
that such acts of natural appropriation precede, or more precisely, inform the 
objectification and therefore also the subjectification that law as a mechanism 
maintains as its main activity. Ultimately Serres challenges Rousseau’s imaginary 
dictum that the foundation of social contract lies in the act of the ‘first [who] after 
enclosing a piece of land thought of saying “This is mine”’38 but rather in the very act 
of the abuse that precedes possession. Serres, however, takes notice of an important 
word in Rousseau’s account, in which ‘enclosed’ (lustrare) means to 'travel all over a 
place, go around its periphery, circle it, inspect it', but also means to purify and clean 
the space, acknowledging that Rousseau was only right for asserting the borders, 
fences and limits.39 Pollution as a circumscribing act is indeed a legal practice. 
Even though pollution is intrinsically an act of externalisation by which we 
appropriate, it is also the very process of cultivating the soil that gave rise to culture. 
Thus what appears as waste actually ‘mediates the transition from nature to culture’40 
33
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8– that is, it informs the very process of separating nature from culture and turns 
environment into an object of appropriation. Serres traces pollution from a localised 
agricultural practice through socio-technological development, it further extends to a 
globalised cultural practice, from hard to soft, from ‘from pagus to page’.41 The 
separation between nature and culture is in the distinction between hard and soft, 
force and code, and pollution presents itself in both: ‘Indeed, we deal with pollution 
only in physical, quantitative terms, that is, by means of the hard sciences. Well no, 
what is at stake here are our intentions, decisions, and conventions. In short, our 
cultures.’42 Even though today’s pollution comes largely from residues and 
‘transformation related to energy’, Serres considers that ‘fundamentally it emanates 
from our will to appropriate, our desire to conquer and expand the space of our 
properties.’43 The increase of appropriation, excretion and pollution comes from the 
body which both ‘marks the extension of appropriated space’ and ‘the increase in the 
number of subjects of appropriation – individual, family, nation.’44 It is in this natural 
process of appropriation where law, as a cultural occurrence, can be understood as an 
act of imitating the natural laws. On the basis of law being an objective 
rationalisation, it has actualised itself as an objectifying technique that gives rise to 
subjectification forging its main axis around which all environmental discourses 
revolve. The global effect of culture, supported by the sciences and their 
technological means and instruments have turned Earth into an object that lies 
passively in front of us, a space of limitless appropriation. 
Serres views the act of pollution as a marker of space and appropriation, but 
also emphasises its concomitant feature of diffusing in the atmosphere and spreading 
out in space. 45 Accordingly, the practices of pollution are not only hard as we most 
commonly understand the environmental crisis, but also soft, manifested through the 
workings of law, science, economics, politics, and culture. As communication 
information technologies successfully envelope the whole world, they widely 
distribute information, brands, and texts that propagate further pollution and invade 
the space and our senses. This not only blocks the way in which we perceive the 
world, but we 'become "possessed" by a more subtle, but potentially even more 
harmful, form of pollution.'46 Appropriation is an ongoing process and with that in 
mind Serres contends that in its growth and continual expansion we come to a point of 
an ‘end of property’47 – a peculiar abstraction similar in quality to what constitutes 
property rights. The global pollution urges us to change ‘our methods of 
appropriation’ because the space we inhabit is not the same, but a ‘new space that 
41
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9cannot be enclosed at all.’ While the old maps supported enclosures, we are now in a 
space of networks that go beyond the limited and restrained spaces; it is ‘a topological 
space without distances.’48 The borders are obliterated, and without them the property 
rights become redundant. 
Indeed, by generalizing or globalizing dirt and so erasing the borders where 
polluting starts or stops, and hence appropriation, the right to property suddenly 
reaches an intolerable threshold and becomes literally unbearable. We must 
therefore rethink this right, meaning go beyond its present status where it still 
resembles animal behaviours. One more step must be taken on the difficult road 
towards hominization.49 
Recently there has been a similar call for reconsidering the private right to property 
for reasons it being a key factor not only for the environmental crisis but also for 
‘promoting environmental harm.’50 From an ecocentric position it is argued that 
modern property law, which is intrinsically anthropocentric needs to recognise the 
value of Earth community that encompasses human and non-humans and recognise an 
‘alternative description of private property’ where the object of ownership becomes a 
subject.51 In contrast, Serres leads us to consider property not as exclusively an 
anthropocentric attribute. Namely he contends that that the current laws are still 
informed by the natural laws: once laws become the subject of rationalisation, the 
processes of objectification manifest anthropocentric qualities disguising their natural 
origins. In the same vein, as it will be discussed below, Serres is not ecocentric as 
nature for him does not carry any intrinsic value beyond its being a condition and a 
circumstance whose presence humans overlook by being engaged with violence and 
ever-growing urge to expand. For rethinking this right, Serres urges us to primarily 
recognise that the very act of appropriating through pollution ‘without limits’ results 
in an inability ‘to enclose a piece of land’.52 In a counterintuitive manner, Serres leads 
us to recognise that ‘[w]hen property knows no limits, the space it occupies no longer 
belongs to anybody, because property existed only to outline a network of borders of 
a world.’53 Serres presents a vision of a world in which appropriation factually brings 
about a world without property. He challenges the representations in which culture 
creates distinctions and where law both actualises and maintains such application. 
Ultimately he admits: ‘I dream, for instance that the space of perception would 
















Mundus, res nullius: the world belongs to no one anymore, not to those who 
struggle to own it, given what the results of this struggle will be, nor to the 
others excluded by that very struggle. Without breathable air and indispensable 
water, without farmable land, without fire from heating, without livestock for 
food… and so, res nullius, mundus: fight no longer for the world, for it no 
longer belongs to humans. Dis-appropriated, it can no longer be appropriated.55 
The world is no longer an object of appropriation but a ‘global rental’ which we do 
not own and in which we only live as tenants: ‘the new contract becomes a rental 
agreement.’56 The very impossibility to appropriate the world requires law, and in this 
case environmental law, to stop imitating the natural laws. In other words, Serres 
hopes for them to soon 'free themselves from their origins' and 'give birth to a set of 
conventions or cultural legislations'.57 In conceiving of these new conventions, Serres 
proposes that contract plays a significant role as a legal instrument that has the means 
to both prescribe and settle the relations with nature. 
The Natural Contract 
Serres’s greatest contribution to the articulation of our relation to nature is The 
Natural Contract published in 1990.58 This work does not fall within any of the 
discussions about ecology, and as Serres remarks himself, it rather 'deals with the 
philosophy and the history of Law, and in particular with the question of who has the 
right to become a legal subject.'59 Indeed, legal history confirms that the recognition 
of legal subjects has continuously been ‘upgraded’ as a response to the social 
rearrangements. Thus the inanimate has indeed become a new category for 
consideration.60 The material world demands rights while the abstract rights require 
their extension. Even though such a recognition of nature as legal subject informed 
the environmental movements in the 1970s which advocated for granting nature with 
legal rights,61 Serres’s project does not fall easily in that discourse since 
understanding his idea of the natural contract requires recognising other elements that 
go beyond the merely subjectifying techniques of the law. The natural contract does 
not imply nor does it argue for rights sensu stricto, but it is as an epistemic instrument 
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non-human – that law supports. For our purposes, Serres helps us to map the position 
of law in the ongoing dialectic that society is entangled with and, moreover, to 
recognise that the established relationship between humanity and nature is 
fundamentally of a legal nature. 
Serres regards the notion of a social contract to be an initial ‘document’ 
according to which a natural contract can be signed. The social contract has not 
succeeded in establishing peace and to depict this he begins the book with a painting 
‘Men Fighting with Sticks’ by Goya in which two adversaries are entangled in a 
violent act and seem not to notice that they are ‘knee-deep in the mud’.62 This depicts 
how the social builds and sustains itself constantly on opposing instances of violence. 
As humanity is embroiled within this violence it overlooks the fact, or even worse, 
forgets ‘the world of things themselves, the sand, the water, the mud, the reeds of the 
marsh’.63 History, as well as law, confirms and contributes to the limitations of this 
bifurcated discussion, of two parties, two sides, two players, two adversaries 
forgetting the place, the location: the middle where these conflicts emerge – the third 
party, ’the world itself.’64 Serres provides us with a square that helps us to consider 
this third party and to see law’s particular role in the relation established with the 
world:
62
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 Michel Serres, Times of Crisis (Anne-Marie Feenberg-Dibon tr, Bloomsbury Publishing 2014) 31
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Figure 1. A diagram depicting Serres’s exposition in The Natural Contract
According to this square, the subjects are always in a dialogue. But before a debate or 
a combat takes place, there is always an agreement that precedes it, ‘a preliminary 
contract’ that stipulates the use of a common code or language. Law limits the 
violence between subjects from passing the line of no return by rendering war as that 
which ‘protects us from the unending reproduction of violence.’65 These subjective 
wars are legal relationships ‘defined by the law’ – the war is, by definition, a legal 
state.  Since the dawn of history these quarrels, conflicts, and furore are fought along 
a diagonal between the rivals and presented as visible spectacles.66 However similarly 
to Goya’s picture, the heated debates hide or overlook the ‘”theater” of hostilities’, the 
‘invisible, tacit, reduced to a stage set’, which takes the third corner of the square: the 
‘worldwide world’. Engaged in their cultural debates, the rivals are subjects 
‘unconsciously joined together’ against the objective world, as they ‘press with all 
their weight on objects, which bear the effects of their actions.’67 But in addition to 
the subjective war, Serres contends that there is a necessity to recognise the objective 
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battle – the square ‘which shows the two rivals on two opposite corners, restores the 
presence of invisible, fearsome players in the other two corners: the worldwide world 
of things, the Earth; the worldly world of contracts, the law.’68
The square turns, standing on one of its corners: such a rapid rotation that the 
rivals’ diagonal, spectacularly visible, appears to become immobile, horizontal, 
invariant through the variations of history. The other diagonal of the gyroscope, 
forming a cross with the first one, becomes the axis of rotation, all the more 
immobile the faster the whole thing moves: a single objective violence, oriented 
more and more consistently toward the world.69 
In this square, law is on the top, the world is at the base, and there are two points that 
hold the positions of the subjects. The law regulates the relation between the subjects, 
while the world provides the basis for their relation. Now imagine the square 
oscillating around its static axis, as the revolution (a natural force!) speeds up. The 
positions of the subjects interchange, one cannot differentiate between them and their 
identity becomes irrelevant; what endures is the diagonal axis where the world and 
law remain still. The square’s axis is fixed on the world and as it turns the subjects 
unceasingly change their position but remain in the same subjective violence and 
overlook the objective violence towards the world. Serres argues that the limit has 
been reached, as the ‘useless vanity of subjective wars’ is involuntary replaced by ‘the 
efficacy of objective violence’.70 Serres indicates that if there is a legal arrangement 
for the subjective wars, ‘there is none for objective violence, which is without limit or 
rule, and thus without history.’71 Under this unregulated threat towards the 
collective,72 therefore, we have to ‘invent a law for objective violence’, similar to our 
ancestors who invented the oldest contract to control the subjective wars. Thus Serres 
suggests that we need to create a contract with ‘the objective enemy of the human 
world: the world as such. A war of everyone against everything.’73 This negative 
recognition of nature paradoxically has the purpose to recognise its positive relevance 
for the humans who forgot about and only recently became aware again of its 
‘destructive’ power: ‘We must decide on peace among ourselves to protect the world, 
and peace with the world to protect ourselves.’74 The necessity for recognising the 
relation that runs along the vertical diagonal requires signing a new contract, which 
would not replace the existing social contract but establish another fundamental 
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this contract, it needs to anthropomorphise nature. But with whom and how can this 
contract be signed? 
The legal subjectification through identifying the intrinsic value of nature as 
part of the environmental ethics has been reoccurring approach that has dominated the 
environmental discourse. Environmental law is imbued with environmental ethics 
whose traditional understanding has been challenged by the radical ecologists as an 
anthropocentric extension to be applied on non-human surrounding. Similarly, 
Serres’s approach has been strongly criticised for overlooking nature’s incapacity to 
understand its own intentions.76 However his proposition to recognise nature as legal 
subject argues against this criticism. In his defence, Serres regrets if he comes across 
as animist, as he believes nature is not a ‘thinking individual’77 nor an entity that can 
speak out in order to negotiate the clauses of the contract, let alone use a hand to sign 
them off.78 With an aim to disprove such a criticism, he insists that we reconsider the 
primary social contract that was ‘unspoken and unwritten: no one has ever read the 
original, or even a copy’,79 it is a virtual contract that has based and settled history of 
men and brought reason upon relations. In that sense, the natural contract similarly to 
the ‘signed’ social contract should be only approached as a ‘precondition.’80 
Furthermore, what is remarkable in Serres’s thought is that nature does not 
easily fall under the anthropocentric category of subjects that law requires in order to 
formalise a contract. Instead he is focusing on the established function of law to 
present an emerging new role of nature that, conceptualised through our legal 
categories, attains the role of a subject. Accordingly, in contrast to Stone’s position to 
treat, integrate and recognise the rights of nature through legislative gestures,81 Serres 
proposes a view that those objects already present themselves as subjects and that we 
have tacitly accepted these ‘things’ as legal subject having rights. He notes that Rio 
and Kyoto protocols confirm the ‘progressive formation of this new global collective 
subject’82 by legally recognising it as an entity. While such a promotion of nature as a 
‘legal person’ can be considered as ‘not more than a philosophical metaphor’,83 Serres 
is using such a metaphor to present the concrete appearance of the world as a subject. 
To further assert the world’s subjectivity, Serres argues that humanity with its 
generated knowledge plays an active role in the process of the world becoming a 
subject. To this end, he introduces the notion of ‘world-objects’ that become apparent, 
as discussed above, by the very ever-expanding anthropogenic pollution through 
appropriation. The globalising effects of the human socio-technological expansion, 
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this spread of the ‘local towards the global’ is what engenders world-objects: ‘Society 
knows, moreover, how to construct and use technologies whose spatial, temporal, and 
energetic dimension are on the scale of worldwide phenomena (…) We’re beginning 
to resemble the Earth’,84 imitating the world’s dimension of space, time, speed and 
energy.85 These world-objects are not ‘lying in front of us’,86 but they envelope us. In 
parallel with the process of appropriation through pollution and our technological 
advancement we are able to perceive world’s global size and we are immersed in its 
totality. The boundaries are obliterated and distances are vanishing so ‘we now live in 
those world-objects as we live in the world.’87 And in this process of reaching ‘almost 
total control and ownership of nature, we end up being owned and controlled more or 
less by nature. We were going to manipulate nature but in turn it manipulates us.’88 A 
new subject with a new face appears, the ‘nature has become a protagonist in human 
culture.’89 Serres summarises the history of the nature/culture relation in three Acts: 
Act I contrasts those things we can manipulate, and things we cannot 
manipulate. In Act II, we increasingly manipulate things we formerly could not 
master. Then suddenly, in Act III, we find ourselves subordinated to those 
things we manipulate, which because we manipulate them, begin to manipulate 
us in return. This is the stage at which nature suddenly reconstitutes itself as the 
sum of its parts and strikes back at us.90 
There is a reversal of the subject-object relationship. While the world used to be 
subjected to human’s mastery and possession, it now becomes subject and us, in turn, 
become objects subjugated to its force, change and violence. The nature, or the global 
object, ‘becomes subject because it reacts to our actions like a partner.’91 While the 
‘medieval couple of subject-object’ and the processes of objectification framed 
modernity, this relation ‘can no longer describe the scene of knowledge and action’.92 
What is important for us here is that Serres identifies the treatment of objects in 
the legal condition. For the Western thought (politics, judiciary, or critique) what 
precedes things [choses] are the causes, which share the similar etymological root 
with causa, which is a legal term used to designate the case that is brought before the 
law and adjudicated upon.93 What appears is that ‘objects themselves only existed 
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according to the debates of an assembly or after the verdict delivered by a jury.’94 In 
that sense, the existence of objects is preceded by a debate, decision, or ‘something 
about which there will be a contract.’95 A legal recognition or ‘authority in fact or by 
right’ is required to validate and legitimise knowledge and action upon a thing. It is in 
this aspect of knowledge creation that law and science share the same roots. They are 
both based on the 'reason that judges and reason that proves'96 and as such inform and 
decide on what is objective: knowledge, objectivity (object), and collectivity (subject) 
fundamentally occur under legal conditions.97 Law, as much as it appears to be global, 
is in practice always spatially localised. Hence for the law, which in principle 
objectifies, such a comprehension of an object in its totality proves to be a disturbing 
process.98 In order to think this new object (condition) Serres does not propose any 
recognition of some intrinsic value to nature or a return to it99 but suggests that ‘we 
need to return to the original legal gesture.’100 The gesture requires a performative 
act recognising the link, connection, bond, contract, or accord established with this 
new emergent object. 
A contract is legally regarded as a relation based on an exchange between two 
subjects. Thus it could be said that a contract is an anthropocentric formation deemed 
to represent the interests of humans (legal persons). The rule of agreements, Serres 
finds, is also present in the construction of knowledge, which is always dependent on 
the tacit invisible contract by which all the ‘relations of science and law, reason and 
judgment’ interact.101 Serres’s approach nevertheless does not attempt to refute or 
neutralise this instilled anthropocentric ‘precondition’. Instead he uses the contract as 
a metaphor to grasp several of its potentials simultaneously, and in that way gain a 
new understanding of the relation (exchange) that is subject of attention to 
environmental law. The Natural Contract generated criticism because at its heart it 
contains this literary metaphor;102 but it is precisely the metaphorical analogy what 
constitutes Serres’s method of breaking and bridging the distinctions of viewpoints, 
and the fragmentation of knowledge.103 While contract are legally considered to be an 
abstraction of obligations (a condition for an exchange), it is the material concreteness 
of the relation that interests Serres and that can only be perceived through metaphors. 
classifying the laws…shaping new laws from new cases’, when nature was not seen as ‘an inherent and 
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As Whiteside rightly points out, the natural contract is not necessarily a legal notion 
‘associated with subjectivity’ but it manifests its physical material quality, which 
Serres traces in the etymological origin of contrahere (to draw together).104 ‘In fact’, 
Serres suggests, ‘the Earth speaks to us in terms of forces, connections, and 
interactions, and that’s enough to make a contract.’105 In this way we are presented to 
consider contract as a relation that precedes both the subject and object by which 
Serres restores the materiality of contract that tightens and pulls. The bonds, he 
writes:
…comprehend, since they join or grasp or seize several things, beasts, or men 
together. The bond is doubtless the first quasi-object suited to making our 
relations visible and concrete; the real chains of obligation, which are light and 
unburdensome within a space, weigh us down at its edges.106
In that sense, Serres proposes ‘that the first legal object was the cord, the 
bond…which we read only abstractly in the terms obligation and alliance, but more 
concretely in attachment, a cord that materializes our relations or changes them into 
things.’107 Hence it is in the specificity of this relation where law imitates nature and 
becomes, as Serres rightly puts it, ‘the refined technology of our relations.’108 The 
contract, however, should not be reduced only to an understanding of that which 
establishes a contact but also as an act that makes distinctions between inside and 
outside, law and non-law, private and public: it symbolises the balancing of the 
relation. Assad rightly points out that Serres’s interests lies in the 'contractual activity' 
that not only determines the relationship but also the act of exclusion which is ‘sine 
qua non of any binary understanding.'109 What Serres urges us to see is that what 
informs law, but also the creation of knowledge and the way in which we comprehend 
our surroundings, is an act of deciding that entails excluding of the middle.  In a 
distinctive way, The Natural Contract attempts to bring to the fore the excluded third, 
or the nature, the other, the excluded outside 'which does not participate in the 
hominization process.'110 
For these reasons, Serres introduces us with the ‘symbiotic rights’ that reject 
the ‘traditional contractual consciousness’111 and its intrinsic necessity to exclude. 
Instead, they go beyond the legal instinct for a contractual locality and recognise the 
global quality of the natural contract. In other words, the global is hardly to be 
integrated within a system (the tradition of legal contracts) whose function is always 
localised. However, one must not forget: despite law’s potential to metamorphose and 
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effect locally, law is one of those objects that have global standing. Responding only 
to the needs of the legal subjects the abusive parasitism on things is maintained. Thus 
only when objects become legal subject, Serres argues, equilibrium becomes 
achievable.112 The rights of symbiosis are defined by reciprocity: ‘however much 
nature gives man, man must give that much back to nature, now a legal subject.113
Yet with this view of law, it seems that Serres allows himself to be drawn into 
the mythic existence of law as a natural force that provides order. As Smith correctly 
indicates, Serres deems law as a ‘natural home of ethics’, overlooking how law is the 
very instrument that is used to constrain and discipline and set hierarchical 
relations.114 To this end, while Smith supports Serres's attempt to revise the relation 
between society and nature, he contends that 'we need genuine dialectic with nature 
rather than a formal "balance" or contract.'115 Serres would agree to an extent, but he 
regards contract as a means through which law confirms ‘our rather stable existence’, 
whereas it is the politics that attest ‘our unstable history.’116 Environmental law in its 
most general capacity and common view has the role, responsibility, and function to 
balance out, regulate and hold-tight the principles by which the environment is 
treated. The balance with Earth, however, should not be understood only through 
law’s declaratory (declamatory) objective of achieving equilibrium, but as an 
objective balance through which we conceptualise and understand our symbiotic 
relationship with it. While the contract could be criticised as an unsuitable way in 
which to recognise the symbiotic correlation, Serres invites us to trace the different 
material qualities of contracts as an inherent principle in which nature and culture 
function. It is situated in the cords that bind and connect together, and these binds 
exist not only between us but extended to nature as well, to that ‘which we have 
continually sought to disengage from.’117 The symbiotic right, as Assad comments, ‘is 
globalized: subject and object, human and earth, enter a contract which falls outside 
all contractual modes, because it knows no exclusion. Yet it will recuperate and 
subsume all laws, that is, the Law.'118 In this manner Serres confronts the criticisms 
that his ethical-legal approach to nature, following the anti-humanist tradition of the 
environmental movements, aims to deconstruct the tradition of humanism and create a 
legal status for the inanimate.119 Serres’s project is fundamentally a humanistic one – 
only legal subjects can ‘proclaim the rights of objects.’120
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While contract may well be a global balancing mechanism that intends to set 
an order, this cannot be read outside the surroundings and circumstances which turn 
law into a local instrument of particular interests and specific actors.  After all, law 
does claim, together with the sciences, to be in a position to circumvent crisis in a way 
that is guided by reason and judgment. Law partakes of the process of deceiving or 
outwitting nature, it impersonates the parasite that pretends not to be present, who 
mimics its host and manifests itself as if the host cannot do without it. Indeed law has 
always been performative.
Denouement: Unmasking Circumstances
The sounding out of the surroundings of environmental law leads us back from where 
we started. In The Five Senses, Serres engages closely with circumstances that could 
be perceived as lines that encircle and give rise to forms and beings. The form(ation) 
could also be considered as ‘a kind of knowledge’ that sustains itself through a habit 
of repetition reducing existence to a mere redundancy.121 A circumstance is a 
condition that always determines the same effects; the very ‘identity of the 
circumstance’ gives rise to an identity (stability of experience) by means of recurring: 
‘Without it, no logic, no manipulation or philosophy.’122 The episteme through its 
logic of reason considers equilibrium as a state that is based on a stasis thus any 
existence of  ‘other’ is excess, a defect. For Serres ‘existence is not deduced from 
identity’ but on the contrary: ‘Existence, a deviation from equilibrium, refers to 
circumstances. The circumstance creates the total set – without the possibility of a 
balance sheet or accounting – of existences themselves, of deviations, imbalances’.123 
More precisely a circumstance is not merely the surroundings we are conditioned by 
but should be understood as a kind of exchange that negotiates the passage: ‘The 
global (matter, energy, information ... law) comes to a locality (cell, body, town ... an 
element of the countryside) through its surroundings (membrane, skin, peripheral 
walls, borders ... circumstances).124 This forces us to recognise that the environment 
as a circumstance is not the other, but engenders the middle, the relation, as a third 
party in our social relations that challenges our instilled binary perceptions.125 The 
third or the middle is the milieu – ‘the totality of the social collective that surrounds 
those who talk of him’.126 The milieu is not necessarily an entity with a particular 
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material quality but it is something that changes forms and modes, from hard to soft, 
from earthquakes to tsunamis, from soil to climate change. It is this third party that 
Serres calls Biogea, ‘an archaic and new country, inert and alive, water, air, fair, the 
earth, the flora and fauna and all the living species.’127 If environment law needs to 
negotiate with this ‘condition’ – drawing on the notion’s original meaning – then it 
needs to be able ‘to speak together’ with it.
How can we act upon this condition and be able to speak together? We are 
fixed in a form of observation that maintains the artificial distance performed by the 
eye as the only valid aspect of engaging and comprehending the world. As 
Macnaghten and Urry note, the hegemony of the vision and ‘its ability to organise the 
other senses produced a transformation of nature as it was turned into spectacle.’128 In 
order to move beyond the visual domination that is exerted over both nature and 
society, they stress the necessity to ‘articulate the embodied character of our 
relationship to nature’, which can be achieved through recognising our relationship 
with senses.129 Recently, Daniel Botkin called for a change of perspective in solving 
environmental issues that goes beyond the sciences. In order to attain this perspective, 
he writes, ‘we must break free of old assumptions and myths about nature and 
ourselves while building on the scientific and technical advances of the past.’130 
Botkin contends that we are not listening or even hearing this dynamic nature, as we 
believe that the environment can be returned to an idealised state where equilibrium is 
possible. The climate change and its indeterminacy are nevertheless immediate and 
we are becoming aware of the conditions upon which we have to act upon. But to act 
upon does not mean to come up with any ‘short-term solutions’ provided by the 
disciplines because in that way we risk of reproducing ‘the causes of the problem by 
reinforcing them.’131 As Paulson suggests, Serres wants us to engage with thinking 
not about the ‘subject's knowledge of an object, but the real time of mutual 
interaction.'132 Serres urges us to see that ‘We are parts of the world (…) The 
objective and the subjective flow into one another, intermixing.’133
To achieve this we need to edify environmental law to perceive the world 
differently. In the West, vision has been considered ‘rational, detached, analytical and 
atomistic’; Ingold, however, suggests that hearing yields ‘a kind of knowledge that is 
intuitive, engaged, synthetic and holistic.’134 Hearing, as opposed to vision, goes 
beyond our ‘face-to-face’ observations that deal in appearances and representations. 
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To engage with hearing ‘establish[es] the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity, of a 
participatory communion of self and other through shared immersion in the stream of 
sound. Vision, in this conception, defines the self individually in opposition to others; 
hearing defines the self socially in relation to others.’135 This distinction of seeing and 
hearing however does not proclaim any hierarchy of the senses; rather, Serres 
emphasises their ‘intermingling’.136 Hearing leads us to consider the necessity for 
moving away from the localised centres that diffuse culture and aim for a universality 
that requires ‘radical decentering’ actualised by ‘bringing together intersections’ that 
sound as a quality encompasses.137 Serres suggests that the quality of sound indicates 
no specific place since it occupies space thus globality in contrast to vision’s 
locality.138 
The Cartesian gesture of understanding the universe as mind and mechanism, 
Thomas Berry suggests, killed the planet and all living beings, and in that moment 
‘[t]he thousandfold voices of the natural world suddenly became inaudible to the 
human. The mountains and rivers and the wind and the sea all became mute insofar as 
humans were concerned.’139 However, while law has contributed to this ‘muteness’, 
the threatening rocks, clouds, lightning, thunder, volcanoes, and hurricanes are all 
gestures in which the world still speaks to us.140 And this certainly should not be 
understood as yet another anthropocentric fable that renders nature in our own image 
but as an attempt to understand that the very anthropomorphising act of giving a voice 
to nature is a form of fighting anthropocentrism.141 The word ‘person’ might had 
originated from personare or ‘to sound through’ causing law not granting rights to the 
‘voiceless’ animate and inanimate natures that cannot speak out or express their 
intentions. But law is still capable of integrating abstract bodies and recognising them 
as legal persons. ‘Persona’ also bears a second meaning – that of a mask. Persona is 
not to resound everywhere but to ‘wear the skins of wild beasts’. Giambattista Vico 
suggests that ancient law ‘introduced so many empty masks without subjects, iura 
imaginaria’ making all the rights of men an invention. He continues: ‘It rested its 
entire reputation on inventing such fables as might preserve the gravity of the laws 
and do justice to the facts,’ thus the doctrine of the law of persons (de iure 
personarum) comes from the masks, that is, the ‘persons’ it had brought ‘into the 
forum.’142 We the main protagonists took the central space of the amphitheatre. 
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Methods in environmental law research need to consider reversing 
circumscription by acknowledging the position of the world in the middle and by 
situating the humans on the periphery. This change in methodological basis is not 
achieved by pursuing the ‘judgmental’ quality of epistemology, and therefore 
contributing to the redundant narrative of divisions, but rather distancing from it and 
finding new epistemic encounters and passages.143  In other words, one such method 
is to follow Serres’s steps, acknowledging the multiple ‘circumstantial’ voices of and 
within the world and pursuing a ‘pluralized’ epistemology.144 But -ology here does 
not lend itself to its meaning as a branch of knowledge, but that coming from legein 
(to speak). 
Serres argues that ontologically nothing distinguishes us ‘from a crystal, a 
plant, an animal, or the order of the world’. This complexity, before knowledge made 
attempts to stabilise it, ‘was [once] called being.’145 The distinctions between nature 
and culture, ontology and epistemology, human and non-human that both law and 
sciences perform through their objectifying techniques can be also recognised in the 
separation of laws and sciences and their respective treatment of nature. They both 
confirm that in their procedural dealings, they contribute to creating knowledge that 
becomes specialised, implying separated territories and disciplines. To use Serres’s 
proposition, knowledge indeed appropriates through pollution (or pollutes through 
appropriation for that matter). He compels our ‘hope for a theory of knowledge that 
reunites the exact and human sciences. A new knowledge, a new epistemology, a new 
man, a new education: we will escape our collective death only on that condition.’146 
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